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WILLS - VALIDITY OF CLAUSE RESTRICTING ALIENATION OF A
LEGACY DURING ADMINISTRATION - A Pennsylvania court in Horton's Estate 1. held thatlegacies are subject to garnishment by a creditor
of the legatee while the property is in the hands of the deceased's
executor. The case also intimated that had the testator so provided in
his will this process would not lie and the creditor would have to stand
by until possession of the property passed to the legatee. This last bit
of dictum has since been established as the law of Pennsylvania by
Holmesburg Building Association v. Badger.2
Of recent years clauses providing that the creditors of a legatee
cannot reach any interest in the decedent's estate and that the legatee's
interest therein shall be inalienable until the property passing from that
estate has actually been handed over to the legatee have been appearing
in some of the will forms. Though a Pennsylvania statute expressly
made such interests subject to garnishment in favor of the legatee's
creditors 3 the Badger case held one of these provisions valid and enforceable. Apparently the only precedents on this point to be found
are two earlier Pennsylvania decisions and an Ohio report,4 all of which
take the view of the Badger case.

38 Pa. Dist. & Co. 183 (1940).
(Pa. Super. 1941) 18 A. (2d) 529.
8 Act of April 13, 1843; Pa. Laws (1843), No. II3, § IO; 12 Pa. Stat. (Purdon,
1931), § 2269.
4'Beck's Estate, 133 Pa. 51, 19A. 302 (1890); Goe's Estate, 146 Pa. 431, 23 A.
383 {1892); Skillman v. Symmes, 7 Ohio Cir. Dec. 39, 14 Ohio Cir. Ct. 547 (1896).
The Pennsylvania cases are more or less dictum and the Ohio case gave no opinion,
contenting itself with citing the two Pennsylvania cases and misusing a section from
Redfield. See 2 REDFIELD, WILLS, 3d ed., 310 (1876).
1.

2
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It cannot be denied that no man should have an interest in property
that is not subject to the payment of his debts. On the other hand, that
it shall be alienable by the beneficial owner and subject to his debts is
not an essential element of any estate in the sense that it is a logical
impossibility for such an estate to exist without these incidents. In the
final analysis, wherever it is held that such provisions are invalid it
will be found that the true reason for the holding is not that the provisions are repugnant to or inconsistent with the estate granted but
that it is deemed to be against public policy, as it is declared by the
statutes or the common law, to permit them to be attached to the particular estate in question. 6
"Legal' doctrines are the product of the constant struggle of
conflicting ideas. In few parts of the law does this appear more
clearly than in that relating to restraints on alienation. On the one
hand are many factors which favor or at least condone the validity
of restraints on the power of the owner of property to alienate his
interests; on the other hand are an impressive group of reasons in
favor of a requirement that the power of alienation be left unfettered."
In general it may be said that the law will permit an owner or
testator to do with his property as he sees fit.7 Where, however, there is
some affirmative reason for restricting this right the courts are not
slow to do so. Thus have arisen the rule against perpetuities, the rule
against accumulations, the doctrine prohibiting direct restraints on alienation, the statute of frauds and numerous other restraints imposed by
the courts curtailing one's ability to do as he wishes with his own
property.
A direct analogy can be drawn between the type of restraint here
under consideration and the spendthrift trust. An outright legacy cannot, of course, constitute a spendthrift trust in any true sense of the
word. Professor Griswold, in his work on spendthrift trusts, goes on to
say, c,Accordingly an attempt to restrain the alienation of such a legacy
is ineffective...." 8 It is submitted that this conclusion does not follow.
The question is purely one of policy-should we permit a restraint of
this kind-and the fact that a legacy is not a spendthrift trust does not
bear on this issue.- Nevertheless a court's attitude toward the spendthrift trust would indicate its probable decision on the validity of the
restraint here under consideration. In this connection it is to be noted
6

GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., II, 214 {1895); I PERRY, TRUSTS,
7th ed., § 386a (1929).
6
GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, § 9 (1936).
7
In re Morgan's Estate, 223 Pa. 228, 72 A. 498 (1909).
8
GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS,§ 258 (1936).
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that the spendthrift trust of principal, rather than that of income, forms
the closest analogy. In effect the situations are exactly the samecreditors of the individual entitled to an absolute interest in the property cannot, under the terms of the instrument setting up the estate,
reach the property until it is handed over to that person. Probably all
states except Pennsylvania hold that where a beneficiary has an immediate right to the principal of a trust no restraint on the voluntary or
involuntary alienation of his right thereto is valid.0 Subsequent to the
decree of distribution a legatee has a present right to receive property
held for him by the executor.10 Thus it would seem that in most states
a testamentary provision against alienation of that interest would be
of no effect. In regard to the right of creditors to attach this interest
before the court has ordered distribution, where such is allowed in
absence of a clause like this,11 the problem is more difficult. The courts
are definitely not in accord as to the validity of spendthrift provisions
restraining alienation of trust principal payable at some future date 12
though the writers agree that such provisions should be held void.18
Courts taking the view that these are invalid would also, if they are consistent, hold invalid the testamentary provision as applied where no
distribution of the estate has been ordered. Apparently such courts as
hold to the contrary fail to distinguish between a restraint on income
and one on principal.1¼ Where a court does not so distinguish, the
question arises whether the policy reasons for holding valid spendthrift
9

GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS,§ 258 (1936); I ScoTT, TRUSTS, § 153.1
(1939); I TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 151 (1935). But see 29 MICH. L. REv. 493
( I 9 3 I) for possible extension of a peculiar Iowa doctrine.
10
Reed v. Hendee, 100 Vt. 351, 137 A. 329 (1927); I WoERNER, ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., 600 (1923). That most courts allow garnishment of an executor
after the order for distribution has been made, see Orlopp v. Schueller, 72 Ohio St.
41, 73 N. E. 1012 (1905).
11
Stratton v. Ham, 8 Ind. 84 (1856), is about the only case permitting garnishment of an executor before the distribution decree in the absence of statute expressly
providing for same. A number of states do, however, have statutes to this effect.
Furthermore, the creditor can proceed in equity to reach the legatee's interest
before distribution has been ordered. Freemont Farmers Union Cooperative Assn. v.
Markussen, 136 Neb. 567, 286 N. W. 784 (1939).
12
Valid: Snyder v. O'Conner, 102 Colo. 567, 81 P. (2d) 773 (1938); Cowles
v. Matthews, 197 Wash. 652, 86 P. (2d) 273 (1939). Invalid: Perabo v. Gallagher,
241 Mass. 207, 135 N. E. II3 (1922); Vellacott v. Murphy, (C. C. A. 5th, 1927)
16 F. (2d) 700. However, note that in the trusts held valid (as well as those held
invalid) the beneficiary is to receive income of the trust during the life of said trust.
If this feature were not present it may be that these courts would hold such trusts
invalid. See l TRUSTS RESTATEMENT,§ 151 (1935).
18
GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRusTs, §§ 105-106 (1936); 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS,
§§ 153.2-153.3 (1939); l TRUSTS RESTATEMENT,§§ 151, 153 (1935).
H GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, § 102 (1936); 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS, § 153.2
(1939).
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provisions regarding trust income apply to the present problem and also
whether there are any further policy arguments unique to this particular problem. In short, does the law, for reasons of public policy,
prohibit the making of these provisions an element of the estate given?
On investigation it is apparent that the specific policy arguments for
and against the spendthrift trust of income furnish no aid here as they
do not apply to the situation. The argument in favor of such trusts is
that it is desirable that the settlor be able to provide protection for his
friends and relatives who may, for one reason or another, be unable
to earn a living or preserve and keep such property as they may obtain.
It is obvious that a clause of the kind involved in the Badger case offers
no such protection. On the other hand, the arguments set forth against
the validity of the spendthrift trust of income, that the apparent wealth
of the beneficiary misleads creditors and that the security of the beneficiary has a bad effect upon his character, have no application.15 The
only reasons a testator could have for inserting in his will a provision
restraining alienation during administration are (a) to enable the legatee, with the cooperation of the executor, to evade his creditors by a
judicious timing of the administration of the estate, (b) to postpone for
a time the inevitable rush of creditors, and ( c) to protect the administration of the estate against interference by the creditors of one or more
of the legatees. The courts cannot be made a sanctuary for property of
the dishonest or elusive debtor. Thus the first two of the above reasons,
together with the general doctrine that one should not be permitted to
hold an interest in property that is not subject to the claims of his
creditors, definitely militate against the validity of the restraint. The
third is of no weight, since the courts will protect property in custodia
legis, as this is, from such interference regardless of the provisions in
the will. 16 Thus in support of the validity of the clause there is only
the general principle that one should be allowed to dispose of his own
property with such restrictions as he deems fit. As already indicated,
this principle will not stand up in the face of policy arguments against
such restrictions, an'd as a consequence it seems the provision should be
declared ineffective as against attaching creditors or assignees of the
legatee.17
15
Obviously if the beneficiary receives all of the principal and income at the
same time there will be no apparent wealth as to the beneficiary before that time; thus
no creditors can be misled into extending credit on the basis of capital the beneficiary
appears to have but in fact does not have.
16
Bankers' Mortgage Co. of Topeka, Kansas v. McComb, (C. C. A. 10th, 1932)
60 F. (2d) 218; Williams v. Smith, 117 Wis. 142, 93 N. W. 464 (1903).
17
Though the same policy arguments do not apply, nevertheless the court's general
attitude toward the spendthrift trust may furnish an indication as to its probable
decision on the validity of the restraint in question.
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An examination of the statutes tends to bear out this conclusion. In
a number of states the legislature has expressly made the interest of a
legatee in the decedent's estate attachable or garnishable.18 Though at
the time of the Badger case Pennsylvania had such a statute 19 the court
held the intent of the testator would nonetheless be given effect. It
can well be argued that if the legislature has said these interests shall
be garnishable then it is beyond the power of an individual to say they
shall not. This reasoning has been used by several courts in invalidating
restraints on legal 20 and equitable 21 interests. Furthermore some states
have passed statutes restricting the creation of spendthrift trusts 22 or
expressly making equitable interests liable for debts the same as legal
interests.23 These would seem to declare a local policy against the type
of restraint here under consideration as well as against the ordinary
spendthrift trust.
Another statute that raises a problem, though of a slightly different
nature, is that prohibiting the suspension of alienation or absolute
ownership for a period longer than two lives, a statute that has been
passed in some form or other in a number of states.24 During the
period of administration there are no persons living who can alienate
an absolute interest in the property of the estate-as in the indestructible trust the property is tied up until it passes to the beneficiary under
the terms of the will. 25 Since this may be longer than the statute permits, or since the period is not measured by lives in being, the restraint
may be declared invalid. It cannot be anticipated, however, that the
whole will would be declared invalid as would a trust under similar
circumstances,26 it being clear the testator would want the will to stand
regardless of the effectiveness of the restraining clause. The considera18

§

Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927), § 9360; 62 Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935),

I.
19

Act of April 13, 1843; Pa. Laws (1843), No. 113, § 10; 12 Pa. Stat. (Purdon,
1931), § 2269.
20
Swan v. Gunderson, 51 S. D. 588, 215 N. W. 884 (1927).
21
Brahmey v. Rollins, 87 N. H. 290, 179 A. 186 (1935).
22
Sheridan v. Krause, 161 Va. 873, 172 S. E. 508 (1934). Statutes like this
generally cannot be said to "restrict" spendthrift trusts as they are, in reality, usually
passed to permit them (in restricted form) where the case law of the state has declared them invalid.
23
Ky. Stat. Ann. (Carroll, 1930), § 2355; Miss. Code Ann. (1930), § 2128;
9 Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1934), § I 1760.
24
E.g., 40 N. Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1938), "Personal Property Law,"

§

II.

25
In re Perkins' Estate, 245 N. Y. 478, 157 N. E. 750 (1927). The mere fact
that the trustee has power to sell an absolute interest in the subject matter did not
make the trust valid. Haynes v. Sherman, 117 N. Y. 433, 22 N. E. 938 (1889).
26
1 BoGERT, TRUSTS 700 (1935).

102

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 40

tion of these statutes naturally brings to mind the rule against perpetuities. It may be, though the cases are few and indefinite on the matter,
that an indestructible trust to last longer than the period permitted by
the rule against perpetuities is thereby destructible. 27 Taking this view
and applying the rule that an indestructible trust to last until the executor handed over the property in the estate to the legatee would
violate the rule against perpetuities,28 the trust would be destructible.
If the rule against perpetuities is applied to trusts in this manner it
would seem that it should also apply to property held by an executor
where the testator has provided that the beneficial interest shall be
inalienable.
Herbert R. Whiting
27

2 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, §§ 557-558 (1936).
If vesting is contingent on the probate of the testator's estate, the limitations are
too remote. GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d. ed., §§ 214b-214e (1915);
Miller v. Weston, 67 Colo. 534, 189 P. 610 (1920). The reasoning behind this i1
that it is possible the probate might be delayed beyond the period allowed by the rule.
28

